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Abstract 
Equity home bias is one of the most enduring puzzles in international finance. 
In this paper, I start out by documenting a novel stylized fact about home bias: 
countries with weaker domestic institutions hold fewer foreign assets. I then 
explore a macroeconomic mechanism by which the presence of agency 
problems in firms may explain this pattern. To do so, I develop a two-country 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of international portfolio choice 
with corporate governance frictions and two distinct agents - outside investors 
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private benefits of control from a firm at a cost which is lower when institutions 
are weaker. I show that the interaction between the insider's private benefits and 
investment decisions leads asset and labor income for outsiders to be more 
negatively correlated in countries with weaker institutions. Thus, outsiders in 
these countries bias their portfolios more towards home assets to hedge their 
labor income risk. Calibrating the model to match existing estimates of private 
benefits of control, I am also able to replicate the cross-country dispersion in 
insider ownership and investment volatility seen in the data. 
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Abstract
Equity home bias is one of the most enduring puzzles in international
nance. In this paper, I start out by documenting a novel stylized fact
about home bias: countries with weaker domestic institutions hold fewer
foreign assets. I then explore a macroeconomic mechanism by which the
presence of agency problems in rms may explain this pattern. To do
so, I develop a two-country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model
of international portfolio choice with corporate governance frictions and
two distinct agents { outside investors (outsiders) and large controlling
shareholders (insiders). Insiders can extract private benets of control
from a rm at a cost which is lower when institutions are weaker. I show
that the interaction between the insider's private benets and investment
decisions leads asset and labor income for outsiders to be more negatively
correlated in countries with weaker institutions. Thus, outsiders in these
countries bias their portfolios more towards home assets to hedge their
labor income risk. Calibrating the model to match existing estimates of
private benets of control, I am also able to replicate the cross-country
dispersion in insider ownership and investment volatility seen in the data.
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11 Introduction
Equity home bias is one of the most enduring puzzles in international -
nance. This paper uncovers a novel stylized fact about home bias: countries
with lower institutional quality (\the South") also hold fewer foreign assets.1
This appears counter-intuitive. Why would countries with worse domestic insti-
tutions be more home-biased in their equity holdings, while having apparently
better alternatives in countries with better institutions (\the North")? The
central contribution of this paper is to show that this striking pattern might
actually be an equilibrium outcome of agency problems in the South.
To better understand the crucial role of agency problems, I start with the
observation that the shares of a rm are typically held by two dierent kinds
of agents, outsiders and insiders. An outsider is an investor who owns stock in
a rm but has no direct control over its operations. A large part of her income
comes from supplying labor. In short, she ts the description of the classical
atomistic agent in a business cycle model. By contrast, an insider is a large
shareholder who has control over the investment, dividend, and employment
policies of a rm by virtue of her sizeable equity stake. Weaker institutions
lower the ability of outsiders to hold insiders accountable for their decisions
through the usual mechanisms of corporate governance. I label this \imperfect
corporate governance."
With this structure in mind, I develop a two-country dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium model of international portfolio choice with two distinct
agents in each country { an outsider and an insider. I incorporate the conict
of interest that arises between these two parties when the latter has full control
of the rm, yet owns only a part of it. Weaker institutions, by opening up
opportunities for self-interested behavior by insiders, aect the payos of claims
to the rm's dividends. This inuences the portfolio choice of both outsiders
and insiders, yielding two main results. First, I nd that for a given size of
the oat portfolio,2 domestic outsiders will exhibit greater home bias in asset
holdings in countries with weaker institutions. Second, in addition to this, worse
institutions will make the domestic oat portfolio itself smaller. The aggregate
home bias in each country will then be the sum of these two elements.
The rst result, that Southern outsiders are more home biased for a given
oat portfolio, follows from the impact of imperfect corporate governance on
the ability of domestic assets to hedge labor income risk. The hedging proper-
ties of domestic assets have been examined as a possible explanation of home
bias by Cole and Obstfeld (1991), Baxter and Jermann (1997), van Wincoop
and Warnock (2006), Coeurdacier and Gourinchas (2008), Heathcote and Perri
(2009), and Coeurdacier et al. (2009), among others. Building especially on the
last two, I show that imperfect corporate governance makes domestic assets a
1Institutional quality, measured by the indices from Kaufmann et al. (2008), refers to
aspects of the economic environment such as the standard of general governance, the strength
of contract enforcement, or the eciency of the judicial system.
2The oat portfolio is a term used to describe the fraction of the Southern market portfolio
actually traded in world equity markets, that is, the part not held by insiders.
2better hedge against labor income risk in countries with worse institutions. The
mechanism, working primarily through the dynamics of investment, plays itself
out as follows.
Consider the case of the South while holding the level of insider owner-
ship constant. Insiders here can extract rents from rms as private benets
of control. Since more rents can be extracted from larger rms, they become
\empire-builders."3 Empire-building aects the dynamics of investment in the
following way. With a persistent productivity process, insiders anticipate a fa-
vorable shock to last for several periods. Hence, they nd it privately optimal to
reduce dividends below the rst-best level to nance socially suboptimal capital
investments in expectation of higher future private benets. At the same time,
a good productivity shock tends to increase labor income in the South, rela-
tive to the North, for two reasons. First, there is equilibrium over-employment
in the Southern representative rm, resulting from higher investment. Second,
the sharper increase in demand for domestic investment buers the decline in
South's terms of trade that follows a favorable supply shock. This contributes
to an increase in the relative value of Southern labor income. Thus, imperfect
corporate governance amplies the negative correlation between dividends on
the domestic asset and labor earnings in the South. Consequently, home bias
for domestic outside investors is greater in the South, due to their increased de-
mand for domestic shares for the purpose of hedging their labor income risk. In
general equilibrium, this also leads to lower Northern ownership of the Southern
oat portfolio.
The second result, that the South also has greater insider ownership of rms,
and hence, a smaller oat portfolio, works through a channel that has been stud-
ied by Admati et al. (1994) and DeMarzo and Uro sevi c (2006).4 As noted earlier,
weaker institutions in the South let domestic insiders extract private benets
of control. Lower insider equity, by reducing the insider's ownership of cash-
ow rights of the rm, increases extraction. Thus, risk-averse Southern insiders,
wishing to diversify country-specic risk by buying foreign assets, can only sell
their stake at a discount; outside investors, anticipating greater extraction, are
only willing to trade shares with the insider at lower prices.5 This acts as an en-
dogenous \transaction tax" on the insider's portfolio adjustments. The insider's
trade-o, between the potential benets of diversication and the penalty of the
transaction tax, determines the size of the oat portfolio of a country. Since the
eect of the transaction tax dominates in the Southern equilibrium, it ends up
with more insider ownership. This outcome can be thought of as home bias on
the part of insiders.
While insider ownership and the agency problems associated with private
3This is a version of the free-cash ow problem rst pointed out by Jensen (1986). Private
benets of control could vary from outright pilferage of rm assets, to more subtle forms
like product discounts to subsidiaries and share sales at low prices to related parties. See
Nenova (2003), Dyck and Zingales (2006), and Albuquerque and Schroth (2009) for empirical
estimates of private benets.
4These papers study the asset pricing problem of a large shareholder in a partial equilibrium
environment.
5The price corresponds to the lower post-trade level of insider ownership.
3benets of control have long been central to the nance literature (see La-
Porta et al. (1998b, 1999, 2000a,b, 2002), Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002), Nenova
(2003), and Dyck and Zingales (2006)), these have not yet been incorporated
into international macroeconomics.6 To the best of my knowledge, this pa-
per presents the rst international real business cycle model with labor income
and endogenous asset returns that characterizes outsider holdings and insider
ownership in the presence of agency issues.
I show how poor institutions may amplify the eects of a well-known candi-
date explanation of home bias, non-diversiable labor income risk. For this, I
draw on insights from two lines of research. The rst is the literature concerning
the implications of agency problems on asset-pricing (Dow et al. (2005), Albu-
querque and Wang (2006, 2008)) and macroeconomic aggregates (Danthine and
Donaldson (2005), Philippon (2006)). My results address international port-
folio allocation in the backdrop of this literature. The second is the recent
work of Heathcote and Perri (2009) and Coeurdacier et al. (2009) that has fo-
cussed on the interaction of trade openness and labor income risk to explain
the home bias puzzle. In contrast, I emphasize a dierent channel, institutional
quality, through which labor income risk determines home bias.7 Thus, this
paper brings together two areas in international macroeconomics and nance
that have, surprisingly, remained separate until now.
In this context, one of the most important results of this paper is that
imperfect corporate governance helps in resolving the asset home bias puzzle
not only by limiting the size of the world oat portfolio, but also by aecting its
ownership pattern. Contrary to intuition, I nd that domestic outside investors
in countries with weaker institutions will hold more of their own country's oat
portfolio because it has weaker institutions. This paints a nuanced picture of
the connection between insider ownership and home bias, a connection rst
described in Dahlquist et al. (2003) and Kho et al. (2006).
Building on the empirical research program of Faria et al. (2007) and Faria
and Mauro (2009), this paper uncovers a new stylized fact about international
asset holdings. It also contributes to the growing literature on the eects of
institutions on economic outcomes such as nancial development (LaPorta et al.
(1997), LaPorta et al. (1998a)) by focusing on institutional heterogeneity in an
international asset pricing framework. My work is also related to the extensive
literature on nancial integration and risk sharing in the presence of nancial
frictions, exemplied by the work of Kehoe and Perri (2002), Bekaert and Harvey
(2003), Levchenko (2005), Kraay et al. (2005), Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2008),
Broner and Ventura (2008, 2009), Bai and Zhang (2008), Broner et al. (2008),
and Kose et al. (2009), among others. The papers most closely related to my
6Albuquerque and Wang (2006) is a notable exception.
7Levy and Sarnat (1970), Tesar and Werner (1995), Lewis (1999), Warnock (2002), Lane
and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), and Srensen et al. (2007) have documented the asset home bias
puzzle over the years. Some theoretical explanations of equity home bias in the nance
and international macroeconomics literature are Cole and Obstfeld (1991), Uppal (1993),
Stockman and Tesar (1995), Brennan and Cao (1997), Baxter and Jermann (1997), Baxter
et al. (1998), Engel and Matsumoto (2006), Coeurdacier (2008), Heathcote and Perri (2009),
and Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009).
4work are Heathcote and Perri (2009), Albuquerque and Wang (2006, 2008), and
Coeurdacier et al. (2009). I discuss the connections between my results and
theirs in more detail in a later section.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 establishes a new
empirical regularity about the cross section of country portfolios and reviews
some that are well-known. Section 3 lays out a dynamic model of portfolio choice
by outsider investors with exogenous insider ownership. Section 4 presents the
main results of the paper and provides intuition for them. Section 5 discusses
an extension with endogenous insider ownership. Section 6 concludes.
2 Stylized facts
This section makes two points. The rst is that countries with weaker local
institutions hold fewer foreign assets relative to their size. They also issue fewer
foreign liabilities relative to their size, a fact that has been noted by Faria and
Mauro (2009). The second is that, countries with weaker institutions have more
insider ownership of their rms, rst pointed out by LaPorta et al. (1999).
2.1 Data description
I look at the years 1996-2004 because that is the period of overlap of my
two main sources of data: external wealth measures for the years 1970-2004
from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), and institutional quality indices for the
years 1996-2007 from Kaufmann et al. (2008). The data sources are summa-
rized in the appendix (7.1.1). Since the theoretical mechanism in the model
is likely to be important only for those countries that make signicant use of
external nancing for rms, I use the sample of LaPorta et al. (1999) with a few
modications.8 The resultant group of 43 countries (21 developed markets, 22
emerging markets by the FTSE classication) retains signicant heterogeneity
in institutional quality.
I focus on portfolio and foreign direct investment as these nancial claims
have explicit equity attached to them, unlike debt. I construct two measures of
diversication using the gross equity (portfolio and foreign direct investment)
assets and liabilities held by a country's nationals, deated by the size of a
country's economy measured by its gross domestic product. I take the simple
average of these measures over the year 1996-2004 to get the cross-section of
holdings. My measure of the quality of institutions is the simple average of the
six indices in Kaufmann et al. (2008) that quantify general governance, the de-
gree of corruption, the rule of law, political stability, eectiveness of regulations,
and the strength of media and public opinion. The index so constructed ranges
8Specically, I include countries that had at least 5 domestic non-nancial publicly traded
rms with no government ownership in 1993. I exclude Luxembourg, Ireland and Switzerland
from the analysis because their gross external positions are unusually large in relation to their
GDP due to their status as nancial centers. The countries are listed in the appendix.
5from -1.21 to 1.78 in my sample, with higher scores assigned to countries with
better institutional quality.9
2.2 Two stylized facts
Stylized fact 1 Better institutional quality in a country is associated with greater
foreign assets and liabilities for that country.
Figure 1: Better institutions associated with more foreign equity assets
and liabilities. Each point represents the time average (1996-2004) for each
country. Institutional quality measured by the Kaufmann et al. (2008) indices
on the x-axis. The ratio of foreign equity assets (liabilities) to GDP in panel 1
(2) on the y-axis. Data source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) and Kaufmann
et al. (2008).
Figure 1 draws a scatter plot with institutional quality on the horizontal
axis and two measures of international diversication on the vertical axis. The
measures of international diversication are the ratios of foreign assets (and
liabilities) to gross domestic product. The world distribution of assets and
liabilities suggest that countries with better domestic institutions are also better
9These are meant to capture the quality of local economic institutions, rather then specic
investor protection laws. Laws are eective only when enforced, and enforcement is dependent
mainly institutional quality. For example, common law countries typically have better investor
protection codied in their laws; yet the list of common law countries includes Zimbabwe,
where such laws can hardly be expected to be useful. On the other hand, the list of civil law,
where investor protection laws are generally weaker, includes Germany, where the existent
laws would possibly be better implemented than in a lot of common law nations.
6diversied using greater cross-holdings.10
Stylized fact 2 Better institutional quality in a country is associated with lower
insider ownership in that country.
Figure 2: Better institutions associated with lower insider ownership;
lower insider ownership associated with greater diversication. Each
point represents the time average (1996-2004) for each country. Institutional
quality measured by the Kaufmann et al. (2008) indices on the x-axis of panel
1. The value-weighted average percentage insider ownership in a country's rms
on y-axis in panel 1 and x-axis of panel 2. The ratio of foreign equity assets and
liabilities to GDP on y-axis in panel 2. Data source: Kho et al. (2006), Lane
and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) and Kaufmann et al. (2008).
The rst panel of gure 2 plots the percentage of market capitalization of a
10In OLS regressions reported in appendix A (7.1.4), institutions remain signicant after
controlling for factors that have been shown in the empirical literature to be important deter-
minants of international diversication (Dahlquist et al. (2003), Kho et al. (2006), Faria et al.
(2007), Coeurdacier (2008)), such as country size (GDP), the level of general development
(per capita GDP), openness to trade (share of total trade in GDP), the level of nancial de-
velopment (domestic credit to GDP ratio), nancial openness (Chinn and Ito (2008) index),
and insider ownership (fraction of market capitalization closely held). The adjusted R-squares
of the tted lines are about 70%. The regressions for equity liabilities for my sample yield
similar results to those reported by Faria et al. (2007) and Faria and Mauro (2009). Year-
by-year regressions for the cross section (not reported here) show that the coecient on the
institutional index has grown larger over the sample period. I do not pursue a time-series
analysis of how changes in diversication may have been aected by changes in institutional
quality. This is because the time-variation in the institutional quality index for each country is
much smaller than the variation across countries. The cross-sectional variance of institutional
quality ranges from roughly 4 to 100 times the variance for individual countries.
7country closely held, versus institutional quality, using a subset of 34 countries
for which insider ownership data has been compiled by Kho et al. (2006). This
shows countries having better institutional quality also exhibiting lower insider
ownership. The second panel of gure 2 plots the ratio of foreign equity assets
plus liabilities to GDP on the vertical axis versus insider ownership. It makes
a point about insider ownership and international risk sharing { the greater
the fraction of nancial claims on a nation available to be held by outsiders,
the more internationally diversied a nation is. That is, freeing up a greater
fraction of the oat portfolio for outside investors leads to greater foreign cross
holdings. Not all the freed domestic liabilities are held by domestic residents.
Nor is all the freed wealth re-invested locally, as some of it nds its way abroad
as an accumulation of foreign assets.
These facts raise several questions about portfolio allocation when insiders
and outsiders co-exist. For instance, given a certain amount of insider ownership,
what is the composition of ownership of foreign versus domestic investors? What
will happen when institutional quality improves in the South? Will the eects
be felt mostly through an expansion of the world oat portfolio, or also through
portfolio adjustments by outsiders? I try to address these questions in a dynamic
framework with insiders and outsiders.
3 A model of outsider portfolios with exogenous
insider ownership
This section lays out a model of international portfolio choice by outsiders
with endogenous labor supply and asset returns. It extends the basic two-
country, two-good framework developed by Backus et al. (1995) by embedding
in it the free-cash-ow problem of Jensen (1986). The agency problem is in-
corporated in reduced form for analytical tractability, as in Albuquerque and
Wang (2008). In what follows, I describe the economic environment in (3.1),
the optimization problems of the agents in (3.2), and the concept of equilibrium
in (3.3).
3.1 Setup
3.1.1 Countries, rms and agents
There are two countries in the world { North and South. North and South
may dier in the quality of their institutions, with the South having weaker
institutions. Institutional quality is modeled in a very specic way that will be
described in detail later. In each country, there is one rm which produces an
internationally traded intermediate good. There are four agents in the world,
two agents in each of the two countries. One of them, labeled the insider, derives
utility from consumption, and does not supply labor inputs. Her only source
of income are dividends from the shares she owns in her own country's rm,
and private benets of control, a concept that will be claried later. The other
8agent, the outsider, is a worker-investor. She earns wages from working in her
own country's rm. She also has dividend income from the shares she holds in
the domestic rm and the foreign rm.
3.1.2 The goods market
Each country produces an internationally traded intermediate good using
capital (K) and labor (L). a(st) is produced only in the North, and b(st) only
in the South.11 Except for the total output of the intermediate goods in the
North and the South, which are denoted by Ya and Yb respectively, all quan-
tities associated with the South are superscripted with a \*". The production
functions for the intermediate goods are
Ya(st) = Z(st)K(st 1)L(st)1  (3.1)
Yb(st) = Z(st)K(st 1)L(st)1  (3.2)
The only source of uncertainty is the technology in the intermediate goods sector
of each country, described by the stochastic processes Z(st) and Z(st). These
evolve according to rst-order auto-regressive processes driven by homoscedastic
shocks (st) and (st).
log(Z(st)) = 11log(Z(st 1)) + 12log(Z(st 1)) + (st) (3.3)
log(Z(st)) = 22log(Z(st 1)) + 21log(Z(st 1)) + (st) (3.4)
Both intermediate goods are used in the production of the nal consumption-
investment good in each country. The two intermediates are combined using a
Cobb-Douglas technology that is not subject to uncertainty
Y (st) = a(st)!b(st)1 ! (3.5)





This sets the elasticity of substitution between Northern and Southern inter-
mediates to unity. A constant fraction of the value of nal output is used in
the purchases of each intermediate input. The Cobb-Douglas assumption is re-
laxed later. ! and ! are assumed to be greater than 1
2 to reect an exogenous
preference for domestic intermediates.
Let the price of the Northern and Southern intermediate be pa and pb,
and the price index of each country's nal consumption good be p(pa;pb) and










p(pa;pb) as the intermediates prices in each country in
11A reminder of standard notation: at each time t, the economy is in state st 2 S, where
S is the set of possible states of the world. The sequence of events from the start of time till
date t is denoted by the history st.
9units of the local nal good. The real exchange rate between the two countries,
which is dened as the price of the Southern nal good relative to the Northern











by the law of one price for the traded intermediate goods. Dened this way, a
depreciation of the real exchange rate for North is an increase in its algebraic
value. The terms of trade for North, similarly, is dened as the price of its






so that an improvement in North's terms of trade is a decline in the algebraic
value of t(st).
3.1.3 Asset markets
There are two assets in xed supply, equity in the Northern intermediate
goods rm, and equity in the Southern intermediate goods rm. The supply of
both assets is normalized to unity. Firms are entirely equity nanced. Agents
do not have access to a full range of Arrow-Debreu contingent claims, and can
save and share risks by holding these two assets at most.
Denition 1 A holder of an equity contract in the Northern (Southern) inter-
mediate goods rm is entitled to dividend D(st) (D(st)) at time t after the
history of events st, paid in units of the nal good of the country in which the
rm is located.
Let ij(st) (where i;j = N;S) denote the share of country j equity held by
outsiders of country i. (st) and (st) denote ownership of own-country equity
by the insider in the North and the South. Thus, asset market clearing requires
NN(st) + SN(st) + (st) = 1 (3.10)
NS(st) + SS(st) + (st) = 1 (3.11)
3.1.4 Description of agents: Insiders
This section lays out a bare bones description of the insider's optimization
problem. A more complete discussion of how the insider aects the equilibrium
comes in a later section (4.1). The insider has sole authority over the decisions of
the representative domestic rm. I assume for the moment that the insider owns
10a fraction  of the rm's equity, but cannot perform asset trades, so that she
has her entire wealth invested in domestic equity. The insider has the following
period-wise ow of income and consumption in the North.
M(st) = D(st) + qa(st)f(st)Ya(st)   (st) (3.12)
where dividends, D(st) are dened by
D(st) = qa(st)[f1   f(st)gfYa(st)g   W(st)L(st)]   fK(st)   (1   )K(st 1)g
(3.13)
f(st) is the fraction of output extracted as private benets of control, and (st)
is the deadweight cost to the insider for doing so.12 The cost of stealing is





which is quadratic in the fraction stolen and linear in the scale of stealing.13 It
depends on a parameter , which captures institutional quality. Higher values of
 correspond to better institutional quality.14The value of  may dier between
the North and the South to reect dierences in institutional quality. When 
diers between the two countries, it will be lower in the South.
Let us consider the insider's problem in the North. She chooses fI(st);D(st);L(st);f(st)g1
0 ,15
which are investments, dividends, labor demand, and fraction of output ex-








Q(st)(D(st) + qa(st)f(st)Y (st)   (st)) (3.15)
where Q(st) is the stochastic discount factor that the insider uses to price her
own ow of income after history st. Q(st) is assumed to be





12Think of  as monetary bribes, the costs of running front companies, doctoring accounts
or paying court-mandated nes in the event of litigation. I assume that this output is simply
burnt and does not enter the consumption stream of any other agent.
13Fractional private benets of control and a quadratic cost-of-stealing function are common
modeling devices used in the corporate nance literature. See Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002)
and Kim and Durnev (2005) for empirical implementations, and Albuquerque and Wang
(2008) for an example of a recent DSGE model which uses these functional forms to model
the free cash ow problem.
14In other words, private benets of control are easier to extract in certain countries due
to institutional failures. This is consistent with the empirical evidence in Nenova (2003) and
Dyck and Zingales (2006). Conversely, better institutions make it easier for outside investors
to extract the free cash ow of a rm in the form of dividends, as in LaPorta et al. (2000b),
and Dittmar et al. (2003).
15Note that in this section of the paper, the insider does not choose her own level of own-
ership. Endogenous insider ownership is explored in a later section.
11where U(M(st)) = log(M(st)) is the utility function of the insider, dened only
over consumption. The Southern insider has a similar problem.
There are two forces of misalignment at work here: the assumption that the
insider maximizes with respect only to her own ow of consumption, not the
stream of dividends; and the discount factor used to value this consumption
stream. Perfect alignment of interests amounts to the insider maximizing divi-
dends with respect to the correct discount factor, which could be a ownership-
weighted average of insider and outsider marginal utilities. I assume the polar
opposite, that the stochastic discount factor in question does not heed the own-
ership of outsiders, and the insider maximizes her own consumption stream.16
3.1.5 Description of agents: Outsiders
There are two representative outsiders in the model, one a resident of the
North and the other residing in the South. They have preferences over the nal
consumption good produced in their own country and leisure. The two outsiders
take the wage earned at the domestic rm and the ow of dividends from the
two representative intermediate goods rms as given and choose a sequence
of consumption, labor supply and asset holdings. For example, the Northern
outsider chooses fC(st);L(st);NN(st);NS(st)g1
0 . The maximization problem








subject to the period-wise budget constraint
C(st) + P(st)(NN(st)   NN(st 1)) + e(st)P(st)(NS(st)   NS(st 1))
= qa(st)W(st)L(st) + NN(st 1)D(st) + NS(st 1)e(st)D(st)
(3.17)
We can also write this budget constraint in terms of a state variable, the out-
sider's nancial wealth, and asset returns. Dene nancial wealth of the North-
ern outsider, (st), as the value of total holdings of assets after history st,
(st)  P(st)NN(st) + P(st)NS(st)  NN(st) + NS(st) (3.18)









16See Danthine and Donaldson (2005) for a discussion on the alignment of discount factors
between owners and managers. Quite intuitively, they nd that an optimal remuneration
package for the manager involves a component that is a function of aggregate labor income.
12The budget constraint of the Northern outsider can then be written as
(st) = qa(st)W(st)L(st) + NN(st 1)R(st) + e(st)NS(st 1)R(st)   C(st)
(3.21)
or,
(st) = qa(st)W(st)L(st) + (st 1) ~ R(st)   C(st) (3.22)






(st 1) e(st)R(st) is the weighted average
return on the entire portfolio.
The felicity function is U(C(st)) = log(C(st))   V (L(st)), an assumption that
is relaxed later.
3.1.6 Optimal combination of intermediate goods
The optimal combination of the two intermediate goods can be found by
thinking of a proxy nal goods rm in each country that takes input prices
qa(st) and qb(st) as given to maximize prots every period. Thus their problem
is static prot maximization.
 = maxfa(st);b(st)gY (a(st);b(st))   qa(st)a(st)   qb(st)b(st) (3.23)
 = maxfa(st);b(st)gY (a(st);b(st))   q
a(st)a(st)   q
b(st)b(st) (3.24)
Having a nal goods rm in each country is just a convenient way to by-
pass specifying a price index for nal consumption for each country. The real
exchange rate between the two countries, which is dened as the relative price
of their consumption bundles, is the same whether we model the aggregation
as taking place in a nal goods sector or in the utility function of the individ-
ual. Therefore, the nal goods sector plays absolutely no role in any of the
qualitative or quantitative results that follow.
3.2 First order and market clearing conditions
First, I set out the optimality and market clearing conditions of the decen-
tralized economy, and then dene the concept of equilibrium in the next section.
3.2.1 First order conditions for the insider's problem
The Northern insider observes the history of states up to the period t, st, and
forms expectations on the future state st+1. Then she decides on investment,











+(1 )] = 1 (3.25)
13This is the inter-temporal optimality condition for investment. Since the cash-
ow ownership of the insider is limited to , she bears only a fraction of the
costs of investment. But private benets of control extracted are a fraction of the
revenue of the rm. Thus she assigns a higher-than-optimal weight to returns
on capital, over and above the normal marginal product of capital, 
qaYa
K . This
is because her private pay-o from capital comes through dividends and private
benets.







This is the period-wise labor demand function. Observe that the agency problem












The last equation states that the insider steals a constant fraction of output in
each period and state, which follows directly from the quadratic cost of stealing
that I assume. This simplies the analysis substantially. There are a similar set
of conditions for the South.
Remark 1 The expression (1+
(1 )
2
2 ) that appears in the rst two optimality
conditions of the insider is the gross payo (before deducting the insider's share
of labor and investment costs) to the insider from dividends and private benets
of control (net costs of extracting that benet) per unit of cash ow rights held.
This payo is lower, the better is the quality of domestic institutions (higher ).
Two conditions need to be imposed on the parameter  for the solution to
be economically meaningful. The rst is trivial, that the fraction of output
consumed as private benets should not exceed 1. Also, the optimal solution to
the investment problem should not require infusion of new funds from investors
in the steady state, which would make steady state dividends and stock prices
negative. Obviously, ensuring the second condition is sucient for the rst to
hold. Note that the condition holding in the non-stochastic steady state does
not ensure that dividends are positive for all states of nature.
Assumption 1 For given insider ownership  and , the institutional quality
parameters  and  are high enough so that dividends are non-negative in the
steady state. These values are provided in the appendix.
3.2.2 First order conditions for the outsider's problem
The outsider observes the history of states up to the period t, st, and forms
expectations on the future state st+1. Since expectations are rational, she can
implicitly calculate expected dividend policy and current labor demand of the
14insider. She then solves for her own optimal consumption, labor supply and
asset allocation, given the insider's behavior. The rst order conditions for
the outsiders are standard. The Northern outsider has the following optimality






















which is the standard asset-pricing Euler equation. The condition for hours
worked is
UC(st)qa(st)W(st) + UL(st)  0
= 0 if L(st) > 0 (3.30)
There are a similar set of conditions for the South.
3.2.3 First order conditions for optimal combination of intermedi-
ates goods
The hypothetical nal goods rms buy the two intermediate inputs in spot
markets. Their optimality conditions for the use of inputs are
!Y (st) = qa(st)a(st) (3.31)
(1   !)Y (st) = qb(st)b(st) (3.32)
such that the fraction of nal output used to pay for intermediates is constant.
There are a similar set of conditions for the South. I stress again at this point
that the introduction of the nal goods rm is just an expositional tool. These
\rms" do not have any prots, do not employ capital or labor, and just serve
as a proxy for the deterministic technology for assembling nal goods from the
two traded intermediates. In short, they play absolutely no substantive role in
this model economy.
3.2.4 Market clearing conditions
Relative prices of intermediate goods, qa(st) and qb(st) adjust such that
a(st) + a(st) = Ya(st) (3.33)
b(st) + b(st) = Yb(st) (3.34)
15The nal consumption good market clearing requires
C(st) + K(st)   (1   )K(st 1) + M(st) = Y (st)   (st) (3.35)
Cm(st) + K(st)   (1   )K(st 1) + M(st) = Y (st)   (st) (3.36)
so that consumption demand by the representative outsider, investment demand
and the consumption of the insider add up to the output of nal goods.
Stock market clearing requires that
NN(st) + SN(st) = 1   (st) (3.37)
NS(st) + SS(st) = 1   (st) (3.38)
so that the total shares held by outsiders in a country's rms is constrained by
the holdings of the insider. The fractions (1   (st)) and (1   (st)) are the
oat portfolios in the North and the South.
3.3 Denition of equilibrium
An equilibrium in this model is a set of prices P(st), P(st), R(st), R(st),
W(st), W(st), qa(st), q
a(st), qb(st), q
b(st), and e(st) for all st and t satisfying
the following conditions
1 The insider's investment, employment and private benets optimality condi-
tions (3.25), (3.26) and (3.27) hold in the North. Analogous conditions hold in
the South.
2 The outsider's stock purchase and labor supply optimality conditions (3.28),
(3.29) and (3.30) hold in the North. Analogous conditions hold in the South.
3 Intermediate inputs are combined optimally according to conditions (3.31)
and (3.32) in the North. Analogous conditions hold in the South.
4 Intermediate inputs resource constraints (3.33) and (3.34) hold worldwide.
5 Final goods resource constraints (3.35) and (3.36) hold in each country.
6 Asset markets clear according to constraints (3.37) and (3.38).
In the equilibrium dened above, insiders make decisions regarding the in-
vestment, dividends, and labor demand of the intermediate goods rms. How
their decisions inuence the equilibrium is discussed in the following section
(4.1). Outsiders take these decision rules as known and given, and formulate
their consumption and labor supply plans. Additionally, they decide how much
of their nancial wealth to invest in each of the two available assets. Section
(4.2) explores these portfolio shares.
164 Outsider portfolios
This section presents the key insights from the model regarding the gen-
eral equilibrium eect of institutional quality and insider ownership on outsider
portfolios. I rst discuss in section 4.1 how the insider's decisions inuence the
second moments of variables that are crucial for the outsider's portfolio decision.
I then provide analytical solutions to the portfolio allocation problem of outside
investors in terms of these second moments in section (4.2), for an exogenous
amount of insider ownership. This is done under some simplifying assumptions
{ countries are symmetric, agents have logarithmic utility in consumption, and
the nal good is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of intermediate goods. These ana-
lytical solutions show the direct link between the insiders' investment decisions
and outsider portfolios. I then implement a numerical technique to solve for
asset prices and outsider portfolios for general functional forms in (4.4) and
(4.5). Armed with these tools, I next dene an equilibrium in which insider
portfolios are endogenous, and solve for equilibrium holdings of both insiders
and outsiders in section (5).
4.1 How does the insider inuence the equilibrium?
The insider's consumption M(st) has three components,
D(st)
| {z }


















 fK(st)   (1   )K(st 1)g
| {z }
investment
The agency problem in the model stems from the insider's limited ownership of
the rm and her ability to extract private benets of control. Because the insider
owns only a fraction  of the rm, in eect (1 ) of her private benets come
from revenues that rightfully belongs to outsiders. The larger the share (1  )
owned by outsiders, the greater the incentive to steal. Thus, the optimal extrac-
tion of private benets of control declines with greater insider ownership and
increases with greater outsider ownership as in Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002)





Multiplying the expression for dividends by the insider's ownership share  and
inspecting the last two terms, we see that the insider pays for only a fraction 
of the labor and investment cost of the rm due to her limited ownership.
 fqa(st)W(st)L(st)g
| {z }
insider share of labor costs
 fK(st)   (1   )K(st 1)g
| {z }
insider share of investment
17Since private benets are proportional to rm size by assumption and the higher
costs of a larger rm are partly subsidized by outside owners, the insider has
an incentive to over-invest. Capital and labor being imperfect substitutes in
production, a higher equilibrium capital stock also requires higher equilibrium
employment. This distinguishes the agency aspect of the model in this paper
from Albuquerque and Wang (2008), who focus only on over-investment.
As noted by these authors, there is also a separate reason that might make
the insider reluctant to over-invest. Since the insider is risk averse and her
consumption stream is derived entirely from the rm, over-investment reduces
her utility by increasing the volatility of her consumption stream. Recall that
the insider is not allowed to trade in other assets. This makes asset markets
incomplete for the insider, because she has to insure against the two shocks in the
world economy using a single asset, her xed holdings in her own rm. This form
of nancial market incompleteness has real eects because the insider attempts
to insure herself by aecting the pay-os to the asset she holds. However, in their
model as in this one, the incentive to over-investment dominates in equilibrium.
4.1.1 How does the insider aect the outsiders' portfolios?
Because of similar goods and asset market setups, the model shares an im-
portant feature of Heathcote and Perri (2009) and Coeurdacier et al. (2009):
relative (to the other country) labor income and asset income are negatively
correlated. This result comes from three interconnected channels. First, a pos-
itive productivity shock in any country leads to an increase in labor income in
that country. Second, it also leads to a worsening of the terms of trade for that
country because of an increase in supply of the their intermediate good. This
is the \automatic insurance" role of the terms of trade emphasized by Cole and
Obstfeld (1991). However, the dynamics of investment dampens the decline in
the terms of trade. Recall that the nal investment good is made from Northern
and Southern intermediates. Since the technology for producing the nal good
is biased towards domestic inputs, an increase in domestic investment due to
the positive shock to technology increases demand for the domestic intermediate
good, cushioning the worsening of the terms of trade. This leads to an overall
increase of the labor income in the country experiencing the positive technology
shock, relative to the other country. Third, the increase in domestic investment
due to the technology shock also leads to a contemporaneous decline in divi-
dends, relative to the other country. These three eects in conjunction induce
a negative correlation between domestic labor income and domestic dividend
income.
The same forces are at work in the present model. However, the presence
of the insider serves as an amplifying mechanism in the connection between
investment and the income processes of outsiders. Following a good productivity
shock that is known to be persistent, insiders nd it optimal to reduce dividends
below rst-best to nance privately optimal projects in expectation of higher
future private benets of control. Figure 3 (4.1.1) shows the simulated labor
income and dividend paths from the model for the North and the South when
18Figure 3: Southern dividends are relatively more volatile and nega-
tively correlated with labor income. The top and bottom panel show
simulated dividend and labor income paths in the North and South. The bench-
mark model has perfect institutions in the North. The dividend process for the
South is for the model calibrated to the lowest decile of institutional quality.
the former has better institutions. In a country with good institutions, labor
income and dividends are weakly positively correlated, whereas, this correlation
is sharply negative in a country with poor governance. Note that dividends are
also more volatile in the South, the vertical axis in each panel having dierent
scales.17
4.2 Analytical solutions to the outsider's portfolio alloca-
tion problem
In this section I follow Heathcote and Perri (2004, 2009) in making a number
of simplifying assumptions to solve for outsider's portfolios. I assume that the
two countries are symmetric in all respects. I also assume that the technology
that combines Northern and Southern intermediates is Cobb-Douglas. Under
these conditions, a constant portfolio rule for outsiders is derived. The purpose
of this proposition is purely to provide intuition for the results of the numer-
ical simulations that follow and to highlight the main qualitative mechanisms
at work. The more interesting case of two countries with dierent institutional
quality is explored numerically.18 The solution in Proposition 1 can be thought
of as equity positions that decentralize a central planner's problem that maxi-
mizes the equally weighted sum of outsider utilities, given optimal behavior by
the insiders in each country.
Proposition 1 There exists an equilibrium for this economy with own-country
portfolio share for outsiders, NN = SS = , such that the consumptions of
17Note that this diagram plots only dividends and labor income, not these variables relative
to the other country's labor income and dividends.
18This problem, due to the ex-ante asymmetry of the countries in question, cannot be solved
by the simple algebra used in this section.
19outside investors are equated across symmetric countries in all states of nature.
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where




is labor's share of total income.
Proof: See appendix. (7.2)
4.2.1 Intuition





which just says that the outsiders should hold half of the world oat port-
folio for the purpose of diversication. This is the same dictum that a simple
consumption-based asset pricing model would deliver, which is to hold the world
oat portfolio in proportion to the agent's share in world wealth. Since only a
fraction (1 ) of the world market portfolio is actually available for purchase,
and by symmetry, each representative outsider owns half of the freely investible
wealth in the world, they each hold 1 
2 .
The second piece is the part of the portfolio which hedges against labor-
income risk. As discussed in the previous section, the demand for this part of
the portfolio comes from the endogenous negative correlation between labor and
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g
In this piece,  0 in the numerator is the share of labor income in GDP. This
can be seen most easily by inspecting the rst order condition for labor em-
ployment (3.26) and the expression for  0. Also observe that as we let the
cost-of-stealing parameter, , go to very large values,  0 ! (1   ), which is
labor's share of income in the Cobb-Douglas production function. The higher
labor income share  0 resulting from beyond optimal rm sizes increases this
term, augmenting the extent of home bias.19 Thus, home bias in equity port-
folios increases with declining institutional quality due to increased demand for
domestic shares from domestic residents for the purpose of labor income risk
19Under perfect alignment of interests, perfect institutional quality, and insider ownership
close to zero, the portfolio described above converges to the portfolio in Heathcote and Perri
(2009), which is  = !+ 2!
1+ 2! .
20hedging. This demonstrates one of the channels by which the model gener-
ates cross sectional variation of asset holdings { the demand for the hedging
component of outsider portfolios is more in countries with weaker institutions
because there is more labor income to hedge. The other channel is an endoge-
nous increase in the covariance between relative labor and dividend income.
This channel is explored in the next section.
Note that there is no hedging demand when ! = 1
2. When this is the case,
domestic investment is made up of equal proportions of the home and foreign
intermediate. As described by Heathcote and Perri (2009), in this case increases
in investment demand translate into equal increases in demand for the domestic
and foreign intermediate goods, thereby having no terms of trade eects, ceteris
paribus. In their model, the crucial feature that drives the home bias result is
the asymmetry of the two countries' investment composition and its eect on
the dynamics of the real exchange rate.20 The investment and terms of trade
channel is eliminated when there is no home bias in investment.
In contrast, the mechanism of the present model is primarily driven by the
asymmetry in the countries' institutions. In the case where we are able to
solve for portfolios analytically, this channel is eliminated completely because
we assume that the two countries have equally bad or good institutions. Thus,
varying the institutional quality parameter in the symmetric case changes home
bias by very little. But signicant quantitative eects are seen when the two
countries are allowed to be asymmetric. However, since this case has to be solved
numerically, the purpose of Proposition 1 (and Proposition 2 in the next section)
is to highlight the qualitative mechanism at work { which is, the moments of
certain endogenous variables.
4.2.2 Intuition using covariances of endogenous variables
Following Heathcote and Perri (2009), we can also write the portfolio as a
covariance ratio of key endogenous variables.
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and 	 =
 L
 D, L =  qa  W  L = Labor income, D = Dividends, ^ L = ^ L  
^ e   ^ L,  ^ D = ^ D   ^ e   ^ D. Hats over variables denote log deviations from
symmetric steady state values and bars above variables denote symmetric steady
state values.
20In a related paper Civelli (2008) shows that what is crucial for the result is home bias in
investment, not all of domestic absorption.
21Proof: See appendix. (7.2)
As shown in a previous section, the presence of the insider aects the mo-
ments of the model's variables. Specically, (i) it increases the relative volatility
of the domestic dividend process, making the domestic asset relatively riskier
and therefore less attractive to outsiders; (ii) it increases the covariance be-
tween relative labor and dividend income, making the domestic asset a better
hedge against labor income risk and therefore more attractive to outsiders; (iii)
it makes the steady state labor income to dividend ratio
 L
 D higher, increasing
the need to hedge labor income risk, thereby making the domestic asset more
attractive to outsiders. Since the eect of (ii) and (iii) dominate (i), the hedge
portfolio increases with worse institutional quality.
Common sense tells us that domestic equity capital should ee from countries
that have weaker institutions. This idea is captured by the volatility eect (i).
However, how much wealth is allocated to an asset depends not only on the
relative variance of its payo but also on the covariance of this payo with
other sources of risk, eect (ii) above. The remainder of the paper shows by
numerical simulations that the eect of these covariances overturns the riskiness
of assets from the South, making them desirable for Southern worker-investors.
4.3 Related literature
The papers that are closest to mine are Albuquerque and Wang (2006, 2008),
referred to as AW (2006) and AW (2008). AW (2006) study the investment and
exchange rate eects of investor protection. They solve for equilibrium consump-
tion allocations of outsiders under the assumption of asset market completeness
and nd portfolios that support these allocations. In their equilibrium, out-
siders in each country hold claims on each other that are independent of the
degree of investor protection. In the present paper, the focus is on portfolio
allocation when the available assets are just equity in Northern and Southern
rms. On the production side, the present model uses labor inputs, and this
brings inecient employment as an additional source of misalignment of in-
centives between insiders and outsiders. The inclusion of labor turns out to
have implications for hedging labor income risk, and makes outsider portfolios
dependent on institutional parameters.
AW (2008) is a closed economy variant of AW (2006) that examines the
eects of poor corporate governance on investment and output. It has a risk
averse insider who is allowed to trade in a risk-less asset and consumes dividend
earnings plus private benets, and an outsider whose consumption is nanced
solely by domestic dividends. The ratio of the marginal utilities of these two
agents between dierent states and dates turn out to be the same because of
the underlying structure of logarithmic utilities and linear private benets, so
that their marginal rates of substitutions coincide. Thus, in equilibrium, there
is no incentives for asset trade between insiders and outsiders for any level
of insider ownership, which is not true here because outsiders' consumptions
are also aected by pay-outs of the foreign equity that they hold in equilibrium.
22Also, insiders have incentives to reduce holdings in their own rm for the purpose
of diversication due to the presence of a second risky security, foreign equity.
Thus, the focus of both AW (2006) and AW (2008) is on the cross-section of
macroeconomic aggregates like investment, stock market volatility, exchange
rates and stock prices, while I attempt to quantify the connection between
institutional quality and country portfolios.
The results on home bias presented in this paper are closely related to those
in Heathcote and Perri (2009), referred to as HP (2009). Specically, the so-
lution in Proposition 1 approaches the portfolio in HP (2009) when three con-
ditions are satised: (i) institutional quality in both countries is perfect; (ii)
insider ownership in both countries is very close to zero; (iii) there is perfect
alignment of interests between the insider and the outsider, in the sense that
the insider uses a weighted average of discount factors of the rm's owners to
value the stream of dividends.
4.4 Numerical solutions of the general model
This section solves the model numerically for two reasons. First, one needs
solutions to the optimal time-paths for non-portfolio variables in order to verify
the intuition provided in the previous section. Second, the time-invariant port-
folio rule derived in the previous section works only under the assumption of log
utility, Cobb-Douglas aggregation, and symmetric countries. The simple alge-
bra used to solve for portfolios rests entirely on the linear structure that comes
out of the logarithmic utility and Cobb-Douglas nal goods aggregation. It is
of interest whether the result of Proposition 1 is robust to more general spec-
ications of utility and technology. Also, solving for portfolio positions when
the countries are asymmetric is especially crucial, because the motivation of the
paper is the observed heterogeneity of institutions in dierent countries. For
the numerical solution, the insider and outsider both have power utility, which
nests logarithmic utility as a special case when the elasticity of inter-temporal
substitution, and co-ecient of risk aversion are both 1;21 the nal good is
made using Armington technology; also, the countries are asymmetric, in that
the level of insider holdings (), and the quality of institutions () are allowed
to be dierent.
Following perturbation techniques, I nd second order Taylor-series approx-
imations of the optimal decision rules for the control variables, and the transi-
tion equations of the endogenous state variables using the algorithms provided
in Schmitt-Groh e and Uribe (2004). The details of this method are reviewed in
section (7.4.2). I follow Devereux and Sutherland (2007) and Tille and Wincoop
(2008) in choosing, for the non-portfolio variables, the non-stochastic steady-
state of the model as the approximation point. As is well known, portfolio shares
are indeterminate in the steady-state. Thus, after the rst step of choosing the
approximation point for non-portfolio variables, I approximate the dynamics
21Though these two parameters arguably have very dierent implications for portfolio allo-
cation, I do not attempt to dierentiate between them using Epstein-Zin utility.
23of the model at dierent guesses for the portfolio shares. In the next step I
use certain criterion to choose between the dierent approximation points for
portfolio shares to come up with the steady-state portfolio value. As detailed
in Judd and Guu (2001) and Devereux and Sutherland (2007), this amounts to
nding a bifurcation point (see Judd (1998), Judd and Guu (2001)), which is the
intersection of the set of stochastic and non-stochastic solutions of the model.
The details of this procedure is described in section (4.4.1).
4.4.1 Choosing the portfolio approximation point
As discussed in recent papers like Devereux and Sutherland (2006, 2007)
and Tille and Wincoop (2008), solving portfolio-choice DSGE using local ap-
proximation techniques is problematic because the portfolio choice problem is
irrelevant in the non-stochastic steady-state, which is the approximation point
used in such an approach. Without uncertainty it does not really matter which
agent owns which stream of dividends, as long as their budget constraints hold.
For example, if the countries are symmetric and thus are equally wealthy ex-
ante, any mirror-image asset holdings can be used to support the steady-state
levels of consumption in each country. As a result, portfolio shares are inde-
terminate at the determinate steady-state for other non-portfolio variables like
capital stock and consumption. Thus, we need to pick out the true steady-state
portfolios of a stochastic economy from the innite possibilities that arise in the
non-stochastic economy.
To do this, I simulate the economy around all points in a ne grid of steady
state portfolio allocations. I store the data generated from these simulations
and use certain criterion to pick the correct approximation point. First of all,
recall that markets are eectively complete for the outsider. This means that
there exists equilibrium portfolio shares such that the Backus and Smith (1993)
full risk-sharing condition holds between outsiders of the two countries. For
example, with power utility, it must be that at the neighborhood of the true
equilibrium
^ c = ^ e +  ^ c
where , ^ c, ^ e, and ^ c are the coecient of relative risk aversion, and log-
deviations from an approximation point, of Northern outsider consumption, the
real exchange rate, and Southern outsider consumption respectively. I search for
that point for which the squared approximation error (S.E.) for this condition,
up to a second order approximation, is the least. In essence, this is the numer-
ical counterpart of solving for an equilibrium using the rst order conditions of
a planner's problem. Let ^  = ^ c   ^ e    ^ c. I choose the steady state s to
minimize
S:E:^  = (^     ^ )
0
(^     ^ )
In the general model of this section, portfolio allocations are not time-invariant,
as in the simplied version of the model in the previous section. Once we have
24the correct approximation point, which by denition will be the average portfolio
holding if the model is simulated around that point, I use the decision rules to
simulate a distribution of asset holdings. To test the accuracy of this method, I
follow Heathcote and Perri (2009) in comparing the numerically derived choice
of steady-state portfolios for symmetric countries, to the analytical solution
derived in Proposition 1 in section 4.2. This provides a robustness check for the
method used.
4.5 Robustness checks: simulations of the general model
Simulations conrm that Proposition 1 carries through to the general case.
In the following simulation, I x the quality of institutions in one country
(North) to very high levels (high ), and vary  for the other country (South).
When I select the portfolio steady-state using the method described in the pre-
vious section, outsider portfolios are home-biased, and the degree of bias goes
down with better institutional quality. The following table gives some simu-
lated average values of portfolios for the two countries diering in the quality of
institutions in the South, for a xed level of insider ownership in each country
( = 0:01,  = 0:5), and perfect quality institutions in the North. The num-
bers for insider ownership are chosen in this simulation so that one can easily
see that the portfolio positions add up to 0.99 in the North and 0.5 in the South.
Table 1: Average portfolios with dierent institutions in the South
Value of  NN SN NS SS
10 0.9738 0.0162 0.0628 0.4372
20 0.9074 0.0826 0.1313 0.3687
100 0.8531 0.1369 0.1479 0.3521
1010 0.84 0.15 0.15 0.35
Going down column 1 of the table, as we increase the value of the institu-
tional quality parameter, outsider portfolios become less home-biased. These
numbers can be given a cross sectional interpretation. As we move down the
column for SN, we see that countries with better institutional quality will hold
more international assets. Likewise, moving down the column for NS, we see
that such countries with should also be associated with higher levels of interna-
tional liabilities. This pattern corresponds closely with the stylized facts noted
before.
4.6 How well does the model explain the cross sectional
dispersion of home bias?
The purpose of these exercises is to see if the model can come close to repli-
cating the data. I use the group of 43 countries for which stylized patterns
25were presented earlier. I try to see if the model can replicate the degree of
home bias in equity assets. First, regressions conrm that trade openness and
institutions are the two most important cross-sectional determinants of inter-
national diversication for this group, as predicted by the model. Qualitatively
speaking, the model predicts (from Proposition 1) the correct sign of the regres-
sion coecients { that countries more open to trade and with better domestic
institutional quality will hold more foreign assets as a fraction of their wealth.
The numerical exercise proceeds as follows. I take one country (North) and
set insider ownership there to be equal to the value for the US (12.35%) reported
in Kho et al 2006. This is the lowest value of insider ownership in the sample.
In terms of the model, =0.1235. I set institutional quality in this country to be
perfect, i.e.,  is set to an arbitrarily large value. For the other country (South),
I x insider ownership to the median insider ownership in the sample (48.45%).
In terms of the model, this means  = 0.4845. Then I vary the quality of
institutions (the parameter ) to match dierent deciles of private benets
of control as a fraction of rm value in the South using estimates from Dyck
and Zingales (2006). For each value of , I solve for the equilibrium fraction
of wealth held in domestic and foreign assets for each of the two countries.
This gives me 10 points. At one end are two symmetric countries with perfect
institutions and the foreign asset holdings of any one of them (because they
are symmetric). At the other end is one country with perfect institutions and
another with private benets in the 10th decile, and there are 8 more such points
in between.
Figure 4: Model versus data. Each dot represents the residuals from a re-
gression of average (1996-2004) diversication for each country on control vari-
ables other than institutional quality. Institutional quality on x-axis. Thus,
the scatter plot shows the partial correlation in the data between portfolios and
institutional quality. The line shown is that tted by OLS to data generated
from the model.
Figure 4 plots the results. I regress diversication on a set of controls other
than institutional quality, and take the residuals of that regression as the data
26points I am trying to explain. In that case, a model without the corporate
governance friction, trivially, would not be able to explain any of this variation,
while the present model explains the cross-sectional dispersion of home bias.
Figure 5: Investment volatility goes down with stronger institutions.
Each dot represents the standard deviation (1996-2004) of xed capital forma-
tion growth rate for a country. Institutional quality measured by the Kaufmann
et al. (2008) indices on the x-axis.
4.6.1 The cross-sectional dispersion of investment volatility
The model also has clear predictions about the cross sectional variation of
the second moments of some observable macroeconomic aggregates. For ex-
ample it predicts that the amplitude of investment uctuations from peak to
trough should go down with better institutions. Figure 5 is a scatter plot of the
standard deviation of the growth rate of xed capital formation versus institu-
tional quality. A regression with the usual controls used in this paper indicate
institutions as the only signicant variable. The years used are 1996-2004. A
longer time sample yields the same cross-sectional dispersion.
5 Endogenous insider ownership
This section extends the model in the previous sections by letting insiders
choose their portfolios. In order to maintain tractability, I make the simplifying
assumption that the insider trades her shares only once during the horizon of
the model. This is a reasonable simplication in the light of two empirical
observations: Kho et al. (2006) note that the time series for average insider
ownership around the world shows little variation, the reasons for which will
be clear in the discussion at the end this section; also, there is ample evidence
that insiders face large xed costs of trading in their control blocks because of
several factors such as asymmetric information between insiders and the market
27(Goldstein and Razin (2006)), price impacts of large share sales because of
negatively sloped demand curve for assets (Shleifer (1986), Chari and Henry
(2004)), and the presence of private benets of control (Nenova (2003), Dyck
and Zingales (2006)). Thus, starting at some level of insider ownership, 0
at t = 0, insiders trade in shares of country portfolios, and this xes insider
ownership  for the rest of time, as in the previous sections. When making this
decision, insiders take the optimal reaction function of all other agents from
time t = 0 onwards as given.
Models such as Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) show that better investor pro-
tection leads to more diuse ownership of assets in a static, risk-neutral frame-
work. When rms are equity nanced, better investor protection and corporate
governance increase the amount of pledgable income for outside investors, in-
creasing the availability of external nancing. The intuition as to why better
institutional quality leads to lower insider ownership in a dynamic model is quite
simple. There are two forces at work. The rst is a risk-averse insider's desire to
diversify internationally by lowering her ownership. However, poor institutional
quality prevents insider from diversifying their positions in the domestic index,
because lower ownership increases their incentives to extract private benets of
control. This reduces the value of the domestic index for outsiders. Outside
investors take this into account, and hence any attempt to reduce ownership
leads to downward revisions of stock prices, and hence, the value of the insider's
holdings. This imposes a \transaction" tax on portfolio adjustments by insid-
ers in markets with poor institutional quality.22 The level of country insider
ownership is determined when these two forces, the diversication benet of the
insider, and the penalty for reducing her stake, balance out.23
5.1 Algorithm for computing insider ownership
Recall from previous sections that I have in place a method for computing
stock prices and the portfolio allocation of outsiders, given a certain level of
insider holdings. Now, I start with a certain level of Southern insider holdings
in the two risky securities, Northern and Southern equity. Let this be (0;
0
)
initially, so that the Southern insider holds equity only in the South. I assume
that the North has perfect institutions and xed low insider ownership. Let
there be an additional period t =  1 just prior to t = 0. In this period, only
the Southern insider chooses her holdings of the two risky securities, Northern
and Southern equity. She trades the securities at prices (P();P()), where
 is the nal holdings of Southern equity of the Southern insider. Note that
because the insider is unable to commit to a certain level of the value-reducing
action because of imperfect corporate control, the stock price depends on the
nal holdings of the insider, , rather than the initial holdings 
0
, as in
22This eect has been analyzed in the nance literature by Admati et al. (1994) and De-
Marzo and Fishman (2007).
23Note that the insider takes into consideration the impact of her sale of shares on the price
of these shares when deciding how much to sell. Thus the insider does not act as a price taker
as in perfectly competitive markets.
28Figure 6: Optimal insider ownership goes down with better institu-
tions. Each dot represents the average utility of the Southern insider when
the model is simulated for 1000 periods at each level of insider ownership. The
negatively sloped line is for weak institutional quality.
Admati et al. (1994) and DeMarzo and Uro sevi c (2006).
The time-line is as follows. In period t =   1, the Southern insiders
announces desired holdings  for time t = 0 to 1. Enforceable contracts are
written between the Southern insider, and outsiders in each country, that the
insider will sell (
0
  ) units of Southern stock and will receive a share of
the Northern stock index at prevailing prices. In period zero, as agreed in the






P0() units of the Northern stock
index are delivered to the Southern insider. Also, trade takes place between
outsiders and portfolio holdings fNN;SN;NS;SSg are established. The
insider takes into account the eect her nal holding has on the stock price, and
consequently, her wealth, when she announces her desired holdings . So she






I describe the numerical algorithm used to evaluate the best  in 7.4.4. In
short, I evaluate the discounted lifetime utility of insiders for various insider
ownership stakes.
Figure 6 plots the result. The downward sloping line (simulation 1) shows
Southern insider utility for various levels of insider ownership when institutions
are weak. Since the stock price falls when the post-trade equity held by the
insider goes down, there is a fall in the insider's wealth. As a result, she gets
very few Northern stocks in exchange for her stake. Thus, though she retains
29private benets of control, her lifetime utility falls because her total dividend
income falls. The insider has no incentive to diversify because weak institutional
quality acts as an endogenous \transaction tax" on her portfolio adjustments.
The other line (simulation 2) shows average insider utility for various levels of
insider holdings when institutional quality is perfect. Note that there is a slight
gain from diversication and there exists an optimal amount of diversication
for the insider when Southern institutions are strong. Thus, ownership tends to
remain concentrated in the South as long as institutions are weak. Also, this
yields the feature that we see in the data (see also LaPorta et al. (1999)), that
countries with weaker institutions have more insider ownership.
6 Conclusion
I analyze the international portfolio diversication problem of small, security-
only investors in the presence of insider ownership, corporate governance fric-
tions, and non-diversiable labor income risk. The main message of the paper
is that imperfect corporate governance inuences the dynamics of investment in
ways that makes equity in domestic rms a better hedge against uctuations in
labor income for residents in a country with poor institutions. This creates a
preference for home assets in countries with poor institutions, a cross-sectional
prediction that is consistent with empirical evidence presented in the paper. I
also solve the model numerically for the optimal amount of insider equity, and
demonstrate the link between insider and outsider portfolios in general equilib-
rium.
Common sense tells us that domestic equity capital should ee from countries
that have weaker institutions. This idea is captured by the model as an increase
in the volatility of dividends in a country with weaker institutions. However,
how much wealth is allocated to an asset depends not only on the relative
variance of its payo but also on the covariance of this payo with other sources
of risk { herein lies the key insight of the paper. Contrary to intuition, I nd
that domestic outside investors in countries with weaker institutions will hold
more of their own country's oat portfolio because it has weaker institutions.
Though most of the stock of international assets is held by a handful of coun-
tries with similar, well-developed capital markets, nations where investor rights
are relatively weak are playing an increasingly important role in international
capital movements. Understanding how agency problems aect macroeconomic
aggregates and portfolio allocation thus constitutes an important set of open
questions which this paper tries to address. An extension of the work in this
paper would seek to provide a fully dynamic framework which yields sharper
quantitative predictions about the degree of insider ownership, and the exact
magnitudes of foreign diversication of countries under dierent institutional
quality. Such an extension would be better able to address questions about
the time-path of asset portfolios after nancial liberalization and institutional
reforms. These issues, and a more complete empirical test of the mechanism by
which the model generates home bias is left for future work.
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Table 2: Data sources
Source paper Data Countries Coverage
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) External wealth 145 1970-2004
Heston et al. (2006) Capital stock, Investment 188 1950-2004
Kho et al. (2006) Insider ownership 46 1994, 2004
LaPorta et al. (1998b) Governance 49 NA
Kaufmann et al. (2008) Governance 212 1996-2007
WorldBank (2008) Trade, GDP; Financial development 126; 104 Variable
7.1.2 Samples
Sample 1: Intersection of set of countries used in LaPorta et al. (1998b), and covered by
WorldBank (2008), excluding nancial centers Ireland and Switzerland (total FA + FL > 150%
of GDP). 43 countries are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile,
Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia,
Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria,
Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka,
Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom United States, Uruguay and Zimbabwe. The
original LaPorta et al. (1998b) sample covers 49 countries from Europe, North and South
America, Africa, Asia, and Australia. There are no socialist or transition economies in their
sample. A country is selected for inclusion by them, if, on the basis of the WorldScope sample
of 15,900 rms from 33 countries and the Moodys International sample of 15,100 non-U.S.
rms from 92 countries, that country had at least 5 domestic nonnancial publicly traded
rms with no government ownership in 1993.
Sample 2: This sample is used to test if worse institutions aect portfolios primarily
through increasing insider ownership and decreasing the oat portfolio. Intersection of set of
countries used in Kho et al. (2006), and covered by WorldBank (2008), excluding nancial cen-
ters Ireland, Luxembourg and Switzerland (total FA + FL > 150% of GDP). 34 countries are:
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden,
Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States.
377.1.3 Correlations between governance indices and dependent vari-
ables
The following table shows the correlations between my dependent variables, which are
foreign assets and liabilities as a fraction of GDP (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007)), and the
six components of my institutional quality measure, taken from Kaufmann et al. (2008). All
six measures show high correlation with the dependent variables, except for \voice". Thus
the relationship between the institutional quality measure, which is the simple average of the
six measures, and the dependent variables is not likely to be driven by a single measure.
Table 3: Pairwise correlations of dependent variables and individual components







General governance 0.7018 0.7267 0.6222
Corruption 0.6809 0.7029 0.6064
Rule of law 0.6088 0.6367 0.5320
Political stability 0.6023 0.6141 0.5461
Regulations 0.6611 0.6633 0.6129
Voice 0.4686 0.5033 0.3927
The following table shows that the institutional quality measure is correlated with the
measures constructed by LaPorta et al. (1998b). The measure seeks to capture those aspects
of general institutional quality which facilitate contract enforcement between outside investors
and insiders. It should be noted here that the anti-director index and the creditor-rights index
constructed by LaPorta et al. (1998b), which are more direct measures of investor protection
and creditor protection respectively, are weakly correlated with the above measures. This is
because the presence of protective laws is related to the legal origin of the country. I place
more importance on institutional quality as a good proxy for the enforcement of rules.
Table 4: Pairwise correlations of institutional quality index and select indices
from LaPorta et al. (1998b) (for Sample 1)
rulelaw repud riskexp account ejud
Institutional quality 0.94 0.90 0.90 0.52 0.69
38Table 5: Pairwise correlations of dependent and independent variables. FA:







Institutional quality 0.6458 0.7217 0.5224
GDP 0.6211 0.6944 0.5022
Per capita GDP 0.5840 0.6491 0.4755
Export+Imports
GDP 0.5862 0.6339 0.4932
Dom: credit to pvt: sec:
GDP 0.6241 0.6662 0.5330
Table 3, 4 and 5. FA: Foreign FDI and Portfolio Assets; FL: Foreign FDI and Portfolio Liabil-
ities; rulelaw: Rule of law; repud: Risk of contract repudiation by government; riskexp: Risk
of expropriation by government; account: Accounting standards; ejud: Eciency of judicial
system. Data source: LaPorta et al. (1998b), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), Kaufmann et al.
(2008) and WorldBank (2008). Sample: intersection of set of countries used in LaPorta et al.
(1998b), and covered by WorldBank (2008), excluding nancial centers Ireland, Luxembourg
and Switzerland (total FA + FL > 150% of GDP).
Table 6: Ownership Concentration in Low and High Institutional quality na-
tions: two-sample t-test across two groups of countries with below and above
median quality of institutions
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
low (0) 19 .5462579 .0342863 .1494505 .4742251 .6182907
high (1) 18 .3990222 .0395198 .1676683 .3156427 .4824017
combined 37 .4746297 .0284791 .1732316 .4168714 .532388
di .1472357 .0521535 .0413584 .2531129
H0: di = 0 d.f.= 35
Ha: di < 0 Ha: di 6= 0 Ha: di >0
Pr(T < t) = 0.9961 Pr(jTj > jtj) = 0.0078 Pr(T > t) = 0.0039
397.1.4 Regressions
Table 7: Foreign assets: OLS regression coecients with heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Institutions .045(:008) .047(:009) .035(:016) .025(:012) .032(:011)
GDP -.014(.01) -.023(.015) -.005(.01) .007(.012)
GDP p.c. .004(.005) .004(.004) .004(.003)
Trade/GDP .002(:0004) .002(:0003)
Fin. dev. -.0009(.0007)
Constant -.022(.015) -.02(.014) -.019(.015) -.124(:024) -.104(:023)
Observations 43 43 43 43 43
Adj. R-squared 0.4807 0.4792 0.4748 0.7168 0.7264
Table 5. Point estimates of regression coecients with heteroscedasticity-robust standard er-
rors in brackets, rounded to three or four signicant digits. Specications (1), (2), (3), (4) and
(5), all with a constant term, consecutively add the regressors mentioned in the rst column.
Coecients marked , , and  are signicant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Dependent
variable: total foreign portfolio and FDI assets. Independent variables: Institutional quality
index is the square of the Kaufmann et al. (2008) index normalized such that the country with
the lowest score is 0; GDP in trillions of USD; per capita GDP in thousands of USD; trade
as percentage of GDP; domestic credit to private sector as percentage of GDP. Data sources:
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), Kaufmann et al. (2008) and WorldBank (2008). Sample:
intersection of set of countries used in LaPorta et al. (1998b), and covered by WorldBank
(2008), excluding nancial centers Ireland, Luxembourg and Switzerland (total FA + FL >
150% of GDP).
40Table 8: Foreign liabilities: OLS regression coecients with heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Institutions .031(:007) .034(:008) .049(:011) .04(:008) .045(:008)
GDP -.023(:01) -.011(.012) .005(.008) .014(.009)
GDP p.c. -.005(.004) -.005(:002) -.006(:003)
Trade/GDP .002(:0002) .002(:0001)
Fin. dev. -.0006(.0003)
Constant .086(:019) .09(:018) .089(:018) -.006(.021) .008(.023)
Observations 43 43 43 43 43
Adj. R-squared 0.3528 0.3830 0.3912 0.6987 0.7026
Table 6. Point estimates of regression coecients with heteroscedasticity-robust standard er-
rors in brackets, rounded to three or four signicant digits. Specications (1), (2), (3), (4)
and (5), all with a constant term, consecutively add the regressors mentioned in the rst
column. Coecients marked   , , and  are signicant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
Dependent variable: total foreign portfolio and FDI liabilities. Independent variables: Insti-
tutional quality index is the square of the Kaufmann et al. (2008) index normalized such that
the country with the lowest score is 0; GDP in trillions of USD; per capita GDP in thou-
sands of USD; trade as percentage of GDP; domestic credit to private sector as percentage of
GDP. Data sources: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), Kaufmann et al. (2008) and WorldBank
(2008). Sample: intersection of set of countries used in LaPorta et al. (1998b), and covered by
WorldBank (2008), excluding nancial centers Ireland, Luxembourg and Switzerland (total
FA + FL > 150% of GDP).
417.2 Appendix B
7.2.1 Planner's problem
The social planner allocates consumption between outsiders of the two countries taking
the sum of income (labor and dividend income) in each period as given (denoted by subscript
\eq"). Since the planner has a static allocation problem after the realization of the state st,
I drop the state notation. Since asset trade takes place between outsiders only, any capital






C(st) + eeqC =  0qaeqYaeq +  
0qbeqYbeq + (1   )Deq + (1   )eeqD
eq






Portfolios which yield this allocation of consumption between outsiders will eectively replicate
the constrained Pareto ecient allocation in this economy.
7.2.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Consider the budget constraints of the outsiders in the two countries.
C(st) + P(st)(NN(st)   NN(st 1)) + e(st)P(st)(NS(st)   NS(st 1))









With time invariant optimal portfolio shares the budget constraints reduce to
C(st) = qa(st)W(st)L(st) + NND(st) + NSe(st)D(st)






























D(st) = qa(st)[f1   f(st)gfYa(st)g   W(st)L(st)]   fK(st)   (1   )K(st 1)g
D(st) = qb(st)[f1   f(st)gfYb(st)g   W(st)L(st)]   fK(st)   (1   )K(st 1)g
42can be written as
D(st) = qa(st)Ya(st)[ 1    0]   I(st)
D(st) = qb(st)Yb(st)[[ 1    0]]   I(st)
where





 +    1

Thus the budget constraints reduce to
C(st) =  0y(st) + NN[( 1    0)y(st)   I(st)] + NSe(st)[( 1    0)y(st)   I(st)]
C(st) =  0y(st) +
SN
e(st)
[( 1    0)y(st)   I(st)] + SS[( 1    0)y(st)   I(st)]
where, for notational simplicity, I have
I(st) = K(st)   (1   )K(st 1)
I(st) = K(st)   (1   )K(st 1)
y(st) = qa(st)Ya(st)
y(st) = qb(st)Yb(st)
With logarithmic utility, the planner's constrained Pareto ecient consumption allocations
are
C(st) = e(st)C(st)
If there exists a portfolio share  such that this condition holds for all states, then  must
satisfy
C(st) e(st)C(st) = [ 0+( 1  0)(2+ 1)]fy(st) e(st)y(st)g (2+ 1)fI(st) e(st)I(st)g = 0
where I have expressed all portfolio shares in terms of  by using symmetry and market
clearing in asset markets, which imply
NN = 
SN = 1      




= qa(st)fa(st) + a(st)g
= !Y (st) + (1   !)e(st)Y (st)
and
y(st) = qb(st)Yb(st)
= qb(st)fb(st) + b(st)g




43Henceforth for all variables x, x(st) denotes the value of x(st)   e(st)x(st). Therefore
y(st) = y(st)   e(st)y(st)
= (2!   1)fY (st)   e(st)Y (st)g
= (2!   1)Y (st)
Using the nal-goods market-clearing conditions and the expression for the insiders' consump-
tion demand
Y (st) = C(st) + K(st)   (1   )K(st 1) + M(st) + (st)
Y (st) = Cm(st) + K(st)   (1   )K(st 1) + M(st) + (st)
M(st) = D(st) + qa(st)f(st)Ya(st)   (st)
M(st) = D(st) + qb(st)f(st)Yb(st)   (st)
together with the expressions for the optimal stealing fraction and dividends, we have
y(st) = (2!   1)Y (st)
= (2!   1)[C(st) + I(st) + f +
(1 + )(1   )2
2
gy(st)   I(st)




fC(st) + (1   )I(st)g
where
 2 = 1   (2!   1)f +
(1 + )(1   )2
2
g
Now, plugging in the value of y(st) in the expression for C(st), we get, for some constant

C(st) = [ 2
 1(1   )(2!   1)f 0 + ( 1    0)(2 +    1)g   (2 +    1)]I(st)
This expression gives us the value of the portfolio share, , that will ensure that the complete
markets condition, C(st) = 0, holds for all states. The value of  is calculated by simply
assuming this the condition holds, and then solving for .
This completes the proof of Proposition 1 in section (4.2).
7.2.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Since portfolio shares are constant, consumption of Northern and Southern outsiders can
be written as,
C(st) = qa(st)W(st)L(st) + NND(st) + NSe(st)D(st)




Denote qa(st)W(st)L(st) by L and qb(st)W(st)L(st) by L.  ensures that
C(st) = e(st)C(st)
Plugging in the values for consumption and log-linearizing the above relationship around the
symmetric steady-state we get,
44 L^ L+  D ^ D+ e  D ^ D(1  )+ e  D^ e(1  ) =  e  L ^ L+ e  L^ e+  D ^ D(1  )+ e  D ^ D+ e  D^ e
Gathering terms and noting that  D =  D,  L =  L,  e = 1 in a symmetric equilibrium we
get
(2 +    1)  D( ^ D   ^ e   ^ D) =  L(^ L   ^ e   ^ L)
Denoting ( ^ D   ^ e   ^ D) as  ^ D and (^ L   ^ e   ^ L) as ^ L we get
(2 +    1)  D ^ D =  L^ L
which gives,
(2 +    1) =  
 L
 D
cov(^ L; ^ D)
var( ^ D)
Solving for  gives the result.
7.3 Appendix C
7.3.1 The steady-state with symmetric countries (and Cobb-Douglas)




b g simply reduce to
qss
a = !!(1   !)1 ! (7.1)
qss
a = !!(1   !)1 ! (7.2)
qss
b = !!(1   !)1 ! (7.3)
qss
b = !!(1   !)1 ! (7.4)
and Lss = Lss,  0 =  
0,  1 =  
1. Thus the non-stochastic steady-state values of all
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1  Lss (7.9)
ass = (1   !)Y ss
a = (1   !)
h 
1   
 0!!(1   !)1 !
1
 +    1
i 
1  Lss (7.10)
bss = (1   !)Y ss
a = (1   !)
h 
1   
 0!!(1   !)1 !
1
 +    1
i 
1  Lss (7.11)
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45Y ss = qss
a Y ss
a = !!(1   !)1 !
h 
1   
 0!!(1   !)1 !
1
 +    1
i 
1  Lss (7.13)
Y ss = qss
b Y ss
b = !!(1   !)1 !
h 
1   
 0!!(1   !)1 !
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Kss (7.16)
Css = (1   )Dss + qss
a WssLss (7.17)
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i 1
1  Lss (7.21)







 +    1
i 1
1  Lss (7.22)
The parameters  and  are selected such that steady state dividends are positive. In
particular
 >
(1   )f(1   )(1   1
)   (2   )( 1
 +    1)g
(1   2)( 1





































ess = 1 (7.31)
As in other models with portfolio selection like Devereux and Sutherland (2007) and Heathcote
and Perri (2009), the value of portfolios in the non-stochastic steady-state is indeterminate.
With ex-ante symmetric countries, any symmetric value of fNN;SSg is an equilibrium, so
that
46NN = SS 2 [0;1] (7.32)
SN = 1      NN (7.33)
NS = 1      SS (7.34)
As a reminder





 +    1

7.3.2 The steady-state with asymmetric countries






















 +    1
i 1
1  Lss (7.36)
Substituting in the production function for intermediate goods we get
Y ss





















and from the denition of dividends, the budget constraints of the four agents, and the nal
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i
Kss (7.41)
Css = Y ss   Mss   Iss   ss (7.42)







































The trade balance is zero in the steady-state. Using this fact, and the rst order conditions
for combining intermediate goods, we get
ass =
!












! + (1   !) Y ss
b (7.57)
With  = 1 (Cobb-Douglas) we have
qss

































where t is the terms of trade of the North, all in terms of K and K. Using the expression
connecting K and K to qa and q
b, and the rst order conditions for intermediate goods
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Note that we can get symmetric countries as a special case of the above, when  = . For



































































































This section contains descriptions of the numerical algorithms used in the paper.
7.4.1 Algorithm for computing approximate equilibrium for out-
siders
1. The rst step is to nd a point around which to approximate the decision rules. This point
is the unique stationary solution to the set of equilibrium conditions of the model, for the case
when there is no uncertainty, that is, the scale parameter of the variance of the driving shocks
is equal to zero. This is called the non-stochastic steady-state. To ensure stationarity of all
variables, and a zero-current account, I follow Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) in positing
a convex portfolio adjustment cost, which pins down a unique non-stochastic steady-state
for portfolio variables, and hence for nancial wealth. The approximation point for portfolio
shares, (NN;NS);(SN;SS) is arbitrary at this juncture, because in the non-stochastic
49steady-state, any portfolio share which keeps the wealth distribution unchanged with respect
to the initial endowment of shares, is an equilibrium. We assume a small convex adjustment
cost of changing portfolios from (NN;NS);(SN;SS). This is done to keep the foreign
wealth position of each country stationary. As noted by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003),
this modication does not signicantly aect the dynamics of other macroeconomic variables
at the level of approximation that these models are analyzed. This technique is also used by
Heathcote and Perri (2009), and like them I nd that the cost of adjustment , can be set to
an arbitrarily small positive number. Of course, the higher  is set, the less portfolio shares
will diverge from the chosen value of (NN;NS);(SN;SS). In this model, I set  to be
0.00001% of the un-weighted average steady-state stock price. Thus the budget constraint of
the outsider in the North is as follows.







(NS(st)   NS)2 = qa(st)W(st)L(st) + NN(st 1)D(st) + NS(st 1)e(st)D(st)
(7.78)
The steady-state values of all variables are provided in the previous section.
2. Around the chosen stationary steady-state, I nd second-order Taylor series approximation
of the optimal dynamics of the control and state variables using the algorithm developed by
Schmitt-Groh e and Uribe (2004).
7.4.2 Second-order optimal dynamics
This section provides a brief review of the approximation technique described in Schmitt-
Groh e and Uribe (2004), henceforth referred to as SGU, which is used to solve the model.24
The n equations characterizing the stochastic equilibrium of this economy can be written in
the form
Etf(yt+1;yt;xt+1;xt) = 0; f : <nynynxnx ! <n
y is a ny 1 vector of control variables and x = (x1;x2)
0
is a nx 1 vector of state variables,
where x1 and x2 are respectively (nx n)1 and n1 vectors of endogenous and exogenous
state variables. The non-stochastic steady-state values of the arguments of f(:) are denoted
by the set fyss;xssg, and these values can be solved from
f(yss;yss;xss;xss) = 0
Lemma 1 For the dynamic system described in the previous sections, there exists a unique,
interior stationary solution for all non-portfolio variables, denoted by fyss;xssg( ).
Proof: See previous section for steady state values. (7.3)
Following the notation of SGU, the solution to the model can be written in the form of
two functions, g(x;) which is the optimal policy function, and h(x;) which describes the




= h(x;) + 
0
where  is a nx  n matrix, partly zeros, describing the variance-covariance structure of the
errors in the exogenous driving variables, which in this case are technology in the Northern and
24In general, though the certainty-equivalent non-stochastic steady-state, and rst-order
approximate solution of the model are the same, they do not coincide with the true stochastic
solution. This is because second or higher order terms of the true solution are signicant in
the presence of uncertainty. See Kim and Kim (2003) and Schmitt-Groh e and Uribe (2004)
for further discussions of this point.
50Southern intermediate goods sector. The two functions g(x;) and h(x;) are approximated
up to the second order by writing them as functions of the rst and second derivative of the
function f in the neighborhood of the approximation point fyss;xssg. By solving a system
of linear equations whose co-ecient matrix comprises of these numerical derivatives of the
known function f, the SGU algorithm arrives at the functions g(x;) and h(x;). The row
of the approximated policy function g(x;) that is of paramount interest to us is the one
which species stochastic-equilibrium portfolio allocations, (x;), as a function of the state
variables, and uncertainty. Further details of this method can be found in Schmitt-Groh e and
Uribe (2004).25
7.4.3 Algorithm for choosing portfolio approximation point
We search in the neighborhood of a set of points (NN;SS)  [0;1]  [0;1] for the
\correct" (in a sense that will be dened below) portfolio approximation point. We search
among those points that keep (non-stochastic) steady-state wealth distribution constant, and
the current account balanced.
Lemma 2 The following locus of portfolios keeps (non-stochastic) steady-state wealth distri-
bution constant, and the current account balanced.
NNPss   SSPssess = (1   )Pss   (1   )Pssess
Proof: Recall that the non-stochastic steady-state values of all variables except portfolio
shares are determinate. Also they are independent of the value of the portfolio shares, for
example, labor incomes in any steady-state are independent of NN and NS. Thus in any
two non-stochastic steady-states (NN;NS) 2 [0;1]  [0;1], denoted by 1 and 2, we must
have
hh1Dss + hf1Dssess = hh2Dss + hf2Dssess
In particular
NNDss + NSDssess = (1   )Dss
Using the stock market clearing condition in the North, and the expression for steady-state
stock prices, this reduces to the condition in the statement of the lemma. Also note that using
the stock market clearing conditions in each country, and the expression for stock steady-state
stock prices
NNPss   SSPssess = (1   )Pss   (1   )Pssess (7.79)
) SNPss = NSPssess (7.80)
which implies that net steady-state transfers are zero. This means the current account is
balanced.
7.4.4 Algorithm for insider's choice of ownership
We are seeking a maximum of the function that maps insider ownership to expected
lifetime utility of the insider.
1. Start with an initial distribution of ownership, 0
.
2. Use the \golden search" algorithm. Choose an interval for , say [min;max].
25A possible issue with this approximation technique is that it ignores the possible het-
eroscedasticity in the endogenous variables (see Evans and Hnatkovska (2007) for a discus-
sion). In the context of this model, this is less of a problem because the feedback mechanism
from asset returns, which depend on higher order moments of state variables, to the decisions
of the rms is weak because of the insider-outsider dichotomy.
513. Approximate optimal decision rules of economy around steady-state with ownership




P0() for each scenario.
4. Simulate economy with above decision rules around min and max. Calculate average
utility of insider in simulations. Update interval according to \golden search" algorithm.
5. Repeat till convergence occurs.
7.5 Appendix E




a North intermediate good used in North
b South intermediate good used in North
a North intermediate good used in South
b South intermediate good used in South
Ya Total North intermediate good produced
Yb Total South intermediate good produced
Price of goods and services
qa North intermediate good price in North
qb South intermediate good price in North
q
a North intermediate good price in South
q
b South intermediate good price in South
W;W  North, South wages
e Real exchange rate
t Terms of trade
Asset market quantities and prices
P;P  North, South stock prices
; Insider ownership in the North, South
NN North outsider's ownership of Northern asset
SN South outsider's ownership of Northern asset
NS North outsider's ownership of Southern asset
SS South outsider's ownership of Southern asset
Parameters
 = 0:99 Discount factor
 = 0:34 Capital share
 = 0:025 Depreciation
! = 0:15 Import share
Z(t) = 0:91Z(t   1) + (t) Domestic shocks
Z(t) = 0:91Z(t   1) + (t) Foreign shocks
2
 = 0:0062 Variance of technology shocks
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